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Civic Culture in Western and Eastern Europe 
 
Abstract:  
 
This paper examines the nature of civic culture and the strength of civic attitudes in post-
communist and western countries. In particular, it seeks to explore the internal consistency and 
durability of civic culture using World Values Survey and European Values Study data. It 
discusses three perspectives on the strength and durability of civic attitudes in East and West, 
(the historical roots, the legacy of communism, and the post-communist transition perspectives) 
and explores to what extent the pattern of civic attitudes in the two regions matches the predicted 
outcomes of these perspectives. The paper finds that the attitudes associated with civic culture 
do not form a coherent syndrome, neither at the individual nor at the societal level. It further finds 
only marginal support for the historical perspective, which accords a great degree of persistence 
to civic culture. It therefore concludes that civic culture is not the monolithic and durable 
phenomenon that some cultural theorists claim it is. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A popular thesis in the social sciences is that civic traditions are more salient in Western 
Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. Among the scholars who subscribe to this 
view, there are many who have located the origin of the difference in the pre-modern 
past. Typically they see the appearance of autonomous cities in many parts of Western 
Europe in the late Middle Ages as the key factor (Bloch 1961, Chirot 1989). These cities 
prevented the Monarchy, the Nobility and the Church from exerting a stifling absolute 
rule and provided shelter for a growing class of entrepreneurs, merchants, craftsmen and 
clerks, who through their various forms of association and cooperation, in which they 
participated as equals, developed the attitudinal and behavioural patterns associated with 
civic culture. By contrast, Central and Eastern Europe, it is argued, lack a history of 
strong independent cities, and therefore the classes seen as supporting civic culture could 
not mature there to a sufficient degree. The rise of the absolutist state in this region 
(Russia, Prussia and Austria) actually exacerbated social inequalities as the aristocracy 
imposed ever more restrictions and duties on the peasant serfs to compensate for the 
imposition of central taxes needed for the institution of a permanent army (Anderson 
1974). Only by brutally suppressing the occasional peasant revolts could the militarized 
states of the East maintain a fragile and stagnant social order. Under these feudal, violent 
and hierarchical conditions, which lasted up to the (late) arrival of modernization, civic 
culture could not flourish. Neither could modernization bring about a change of values as 
its specific brand in Central and Eastern Europe was too top-down, too artificial or too 
much imposed by foreign forces to be able to cultivate the civic-democratic patterns of 
Western Europe. Barrington Moore (1966), for instance, argues that the involvement of 
the aristocracy and the state in the industrialization of Germany and Japan proved fatal 
for the development of democracy in these countries. Instead of national identities based 
on civic-democratic principles, Eastern nations developed allegiances based on kinship, 
race, language and folk history, so the story goes. 
 A well-known historian agreeing to this version of events is Hans Kohn (1944; 
1994). He added a normative and thus provocative dimension to the civic-West / ethnic-
East framework by contending that civic identities are conducive to democracy, tolerance 
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and freedom while ethnic thinking is the necessary companion of authoritarianism, 
oppression and xenophobia. Unsurprisingly, it is precisely this normative element (civic 
= „good‟; ethnic = „bad‟) that has inspired a heated debate in the study of nationalism in 
recent years. Scholars have attacked the framework on historical grounds by arguing that 
Western nations, like Eastern ones, have ethnic roots (Smith 1986) and have pursued 
exclusionary policies towards ethnic others in the past (Kuzio 2002). Theoretically, the 
dichotomy has been criticised for employing categories (ethnic; civic) that collapse too 
many unrelated notions (Kymlicka 1999a), and for failing to note that nations defining 
themselves in civic terms, such as the Latin American countries, need not always have 
strong democratic traditions (Nielsen 1999). Lastly, academics have questioned its 
empirical validity by observing that the variation within the West and within the East is 
larger than that between the regions in terms of how people understand their national 
identities (Shulman 2002). Given the profound criticism the framework has attracted, and 
notably the Hans Kohn variety, it has few supporters today in the field of nationalism.  
Remarkably, in their analyses of the Kohn dichotomy students of nationalism 
have only assessed whether national identities are conceived in civic or ethnic terms, not 
the substance of civic culture itself. In other words they have not explored whether the 
citizenries of the West and the East differ in levels of social trust, participation in non-
state organizations and public spiritedness, elements which are usually associated with 
civic culture. This theme has been the exclusive domain of social capital theory, a strand 
of research that has rapidly developed after the publication of Robert Putnam‟s influential 
work Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993). In this book 
Putnam argues that the presence of civic culture in the northern part of Italy and its 
absence in the South is the key explanation for the differential rate of success of regional 
government in the country. In tracing the roots of civic culture, he closely follows the 
historical argument outlined above: in the free cities of the North civic associations of 
equals based on trust, norms of reciprocity and perceptions of the common good thrived, 
while the sophisticated authoritarian state apparatus left behind by the powerful Norman 
king Frederick II in the thirteenth century precluded similar processes from occurring in 
the South. By locating the origins of civic culture in the Middle Ages and by seeing it as 
the single most important factor shaping the performance of political institutions, Putnam 
accords a great amount of stability, solidity and explanatory power to civic culture. 
Although in later works he concedes that civic culture in its turn is affected by economic, 
political and technological developments (Putnam 2000, Putnam and Goss 2002), the 
emphasis is clearly on the reverse relationship in Making Democracy Work. On top of 
that, Putnam considers civic culture to embody a distinct set of interrelated attitudes. 
People in a civic community, he writes, “on most accounts, are more than merely active, 
public-spirited, and equal. Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward 
one another” (1993, p. 88). The idea of civic culture as a coherent syndrome of 
dispositions is expressed even clearer in Bowling Alone:  
 
people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more readily to 
charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations, serve more 
readily in juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax 
obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic 
virtue (Putnam 2000, p. 137). 
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According to Jackman and Miller (2005), Putnam is certainly not alone in assuming civic 
culture to be a coherent and durable phenomenon that is relatively impervious to political 
and economic events. These assumptions, in their view, are characteristic of culture 
theorists in general, i.e. of those scholars who hold culture to be the key factor shaping 
societal trends, whether it is Weber (Protestantism), Banfield (amoral familism) or 
Huntingdon (civilizations based on religion). 
 In this paper I focus on these crucial assumptions. I will examine the coherence 
and durability of civic culture by analyzing the nature of civic culture and the strength of 
civic attitudes in East and West. I rely on data from the 1990, 1995 and 1999 editions of 
the World Values Survey (WVS) and on the 1999 edition of the European Values Study 
(1999) to explore these issues. The first section of the paper discusses the various 
approaches to civic culture, the relation of the concept to the more commonly used notion 
of social capital, and the coherence of civic culture at both the individual and societal 
level. Subsequently, the paper compares the nature of civic culture in western countries 
and transition states. The last section introduces three perspectives on civic culture: the 
historical roots idea outline above, a perspective stressing the legacy of communism and 
a theory on the effects of post-communist transition. Each of these perspectives accords a 
different degree of malleability to civic culture and predicts a slightly different pattern of 
civic values across and within East and West. By comparing the explanatory value of 
these perspectives, I will arrive at conclusions about the solidity of civic culture in 
general.  
 The relevance of examining the consistency and durability of civic culture is 
obvious as the phenomenon is often seen as a precondition for democracy and the rule of 
law (see discussion below). If civic culture is indeed crucial for democracy and it is as 
one-dimensional and difficult to generate as cultural theorists contend, then all attempts 
to introduce democracy in non-civic environments (e.g. the Anglo-American efforts in 
Iraq) would appear to be a waste of time and energy. The results of this study, however, 
give the missionaries of democracy some grounds for optimism. Neither at the individual 
nor at the societal level does civic culture appear to be a cohesive one-dimensional 
syndrome. Only some aspects of civic culture seem to be quite durable as their cross-
country patterns are reasonably well explained by the historical perspective. Most aspects 
would appear to be quite changeable since their distributions are more in line with the 
two perspectives that see civic culture as a more pliable phenomenon. These findings 
imply that „civic culture‟ needs to be understood as no more than an umbrella term 
embracing a collection of highly diverse values which are more pliable than is often 
thought. This suggests that socio-economic and political transformations do have the 
potential to bring about a desired change in values, also in traditionally „uncivic‟ 
environments.  
 
 
Civic Culture and Social Capital 
 
How has academia understood and evaluated civic culture? A review of the literature 
reveals, first of all, that the term is subject to much confusion as there seem to be as many 
definitions of civic culture as there are scholars writing about the subject. These 
definitions are partly overlapping and partly diverging. All of them for instance stress 
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attitudes such as public spiritedness, participation and tolerance but only some include 
critical engagement (Kymlicka 1999b, 2002) or certain economic virtues (Galston 1991). 
Moreover, although essentially referring to the same phenomenon, each scholar employs 
his or her own distinctive labels. Thus, whereas Almond and Verba (1963) indeed speak 
of “civic culture”, Putnam (1993) uses “civic community”, and Kymlicka (2002) and 
Galston (1991) speak of “civic virtues” and “liberal virtues”, respectively.  
These differences however hide one important similarity. In an echo of Kohn, all 
four scholars see civic culture as a sine qua non for democracy. In other words, even with 
all the institutional arrangements in place, a democracy will not function effectively and 
will not be sustainable in the long run if it is not supported by an active and engaged 
citizenry. As Kymlicka (1999, 2002) explains, this has become painstakingly clear from 
events in the post-colonial world, where political elites have abused the state apparatus to 
favour their own ethnic group or class at the expense of others. In order to prevent 
irresponsible elites from hijacking the state, he argues, a democracy needs a citizenry that 
critically scrutinizes policy, holds politicians accountable, and actively engages in public 
affairs through reasoned and civilized deliberation. These for him are the core civic 
virtues on which democracy rests. Though having a broader understanding of civic 
culture than Kymlicka, Almond and Verba, as the pioneers in this field of study, would 
also subscribe to the view that democracy is upheld by politically active citizens. They 
see civic culture as an all-inclusive phenomenon comprising participant attitudes in 
addition to the more traditional parochial and subject orientations, yet hold only 
participant attitudes to be distinctive of democracies: “In general, a parochial, subject, or 
participant culture would be most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political 
structure, a centralized authoritarian structure and a democratic political structure” 
(Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 20). Espousing a similarly broad view of civic culture, 
Galston clusters a variety of social, economic and political virtues under the label “liberal 
virtues” and argues that a majority of citizens must have these qualities for democracy to 
perform well:  
 
When I speak of certain virtues as instrumental to the preservation of liberal 
communities, I mean not that every citizen must possess these virtues but, rather, that 
most citizens must. The broad hypothesis is that as the proportion of non-virtuous citizens 
increases significantly, the ability of liberal societies to function successfully 
progressively diminishes (Galston 1991, p. 220). 
 
The vast literature on social capital has likewise mainly focused on the link between 
social networks, as the core component of social capital, and democracy. Central to the 
debate has been the question whether high levels of civic associations and activity are 
always conducive to social trust and democracy. Critics of social capital theory have 
argued that organizations based on ethnic, religious or other cultural commonalities, 
particularly in culturally diverse societies, could well reinforce existing divisions, 
promote distrust between communities and therefore complicate democratic government 
(Portess and Landholt 1996; Dowley and Silver 2002; Norris 2002; Green, Preston and 
Sabates 2003). Advocates of the theory have responded that a distinction needs to be 
made between bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) forms of association. 
Bonding networks are good for “thick” interpersonal trust, solidarity and psychological 
security, but they need to be complemented by bridging networks which, though based on 
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weak ties, help individuals in getting access to new information and expanding their 
horizons. It is the bridging rather than the bonding forms of social capital that hold 
society together (De Souza Briggs 1998, Putnam 2000; Putnam and Goss 2002).  
The preoccupation of social capital theory with democracy and social cohesion 
seems to have diverted attention away from issues of coherence and conceptual clarity. 
How does social capital for instance relate to civic culture? While some authors use the 
terms interchangeably, others, Putnam included, seem to regard social capital as a 
specific subset or core component of the values associated with civic culture. Defining 
social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms [of reciprocity, JGJ] 
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam 1993, p. 167), he sees the phenomenon as capable of not only 
reproducing itself, but also of engendering the other characteristics of the civic 
community. Perhaps because social capital in most accounts is a more parsimonious 
concept than civic culture, it has largely replaced the latter in cultural theory and political 
science. Yet, given the widely diverging definitions of civic culture and Putnam‟s 
insistence on seeing it as a coherent syndrome of attitudes (see above), it is surprising that 
the concept of civic culture has not drawn more attention from the academic community.  
Interestingly, Putnam (1993) himself did explore the internal consistency of the 
concept. Using aggregate data at the regional level, he discovered a one-dimensional 
syndrome of the „civic community‟ consisting of preference voting, referendum turnout, 
newspaper readership and density of sports and cultural associations, but, as Jackman and 
Miller (1996) rightly point out, this construct captures only aggregates of behavioural 
indices and does not include attitudes, values and dispositions. In response to this 
criticism, Brehm and Rahn (1997) have shown that a social capital syndrome comprising 
both a behavioural indicator (civic associations) and an attitude (interpersonal trust) does 
exist at the individual level. Their analysis, however, does not cover the many other 
notions associated with civic culture and is only based on data from the United States (the 
General Social Survey). It is quite feasible that different patterns emerge in other 
countries. Moreover, they have not explored the conceptual boundaries of their construct. 
We thus do not know to what extent it can be separated from concepts in the semantic 
vicinity.  
Related to the issue of coherence is the question on which level civic culture is 
operating and how it compares in this regard to social capital. Scholars are not in 
agreement regarding the nature of the latter. On the one hand there are those who view 
social capital as a private good which can be mobilised by individuals to accumulate 
wealth and status (Bourdieu 1993) or to engage in politics and attain political goals 
(Olson 1972). Other scholars consider social capital to be a property of a community 
rather than an individual (Putnam 1993; Newton 2001; Norris 2002).  In their view, the 
public good character of social capital means that individuals living in a society with high 
levels of social capital automatically benefit from this situation irrespective of their 
contribution to the phenomenon (van Deth 2001). They also hold social capital to be self-
perpetuating and reinforcing. In other words, individuals cannot be excluded from the 
consumption of social capital, but this is not problematic since consumption increases 
rather than decreases overall stocks of social capital. Remarkably, though seeing social 
capital as a public good, Putnam argues that its components also cluster at the individual 
level: 
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Our discussion of trends in social connectedness and civic engagement has tacitly 
assumed that all the forms of social capital that we have discussed are themselves 
coherently correlated across individuals. This is in fact true. Members of associations are 
much more likely than non-members to participate in politics, to spend time with 
neighbors, to express social trust and so on (quoted in Badescu and Uslaner 2003, p. 8). 
 
Likewise, as illustrated by the quotations above, he considers individuals in the „civic 
community‟ to display a range of civic virtues simultaneously. Thus, in Putnam‟s 
philosophy, there should at least be a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual 
level. On top of that, social capital, as the set of core characteristics of civic culture, 
should constitute a one-dimensional phenomenon at both the individual and the societal 
level. The idea of social capital as a distinct societal phenomenon has, however, been 
questioned by Green, Preston and Janmaat (2006). They argue that contextual factors 
operating at the societal level may have such a large impact on trust and association as 
the core characteristics of social capital that in their aggregate these characteristics are no 
longer interrelated. To illustrate their argument they note that the Nordic countries 
combine high levels of trust with moderate levels of associations while the reverse 
applies in the USA. In the following I explore to what extent survey data support the idea 
of a distinct syndrome of civic attitudes at either the individual or societal level. 
 The problem of conceptual coherence and the public or private nature of civic 
culture have obvious relevance for this paper as civic culture may be understood in 
different ways across the East and the West. I will turn to this issue in the next section. 
First I assess to what extent the elements of civic culture cluster at both the individual and 
the societal level using the pooled data of Eastern and Western countries (I labelled 
countries with a communist past as „Eastern‟ and all others as „Western‟ 1). To begin with 
the individual level, when would civic culture, statistically speaking, be accepted as an 
internally homogenous and externally distinctive concept? It would be accepted as such if 
the notions it includes meet two conditions: (1) the correlations amongst them are 
stronger than those between them and concepts not associated with civic culture, (2) these 
correlations are in the expected direction. To take an example, the civic culture elements 
of participation and social trust should be more closely related to one another than either 
of the two with, say, baldheadedness at age 30, and this correlation should be positive - 
i.e. those participating should be more trusting than those not participating.  
I employed the set of characteristics Putnam (1993, pp. 87-89) ascribes to the 
civic community to identify the civic culture indicators in the WVS and EVS data bases 
(see Table 1). The table also states how these indicators will be referred to in the 
following. Subsequently, I correlated the civic culture items with each other and with 
items not associated with civic culture – level of education, feeling of happiness, state of 
                                                 
1
 I use the unweighted data, which means that each nation has an equal weight in the pooled data set. The 
data set consists of 56 countries in total. The East is represented by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The 
West is represented by Canada, USA, Australia, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Switzerland, 
Austria, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece.  
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health, importance of work vs. leisure (see Table 2
2
). To be sure, these non-civic items 
are likely to show a link with the civic culture items (notably education), but if these 
links are stronger than the relations among the civic culture items themselves, the 
conceptual coherence of civic culture is undermined. The results of Table 2 support the 
idea of a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level only to a certain 
degree. The good news for civic culture theorists is that the correlations amongst the 
indicators of civic culture are nearly all in the expected direction (only 2 out of 66 
correlations do not conform to the expected pattern). The bad news, however, is that the 
correlations amongst the civic culture items are not stronger than those between the civic 
and the non-civic items (while 16 out of 36 civicXnoncivic correlations are larger than 
0.1, roughly the same proportion (29 out of 66) applies to the civicXcivic correlations 
which are larger than 0.1).  The overall level of correlations, moreover, is low with many 
correlations not exceeding the value of 0.25. The vast majority of the correlations are 
significant but this is only because of the high number of respondents (N > 37,000 for all 
correlations). In sum, the data for all countries combined do support Putnam‟s claim that 
more politically engaged individuals are also more trusting, helpful, tolerant etc, but the 
links between these civic virtues are not very strong and many are as closely linked to 
notions not associated with civic culture. There is thus no evidence of a clearly 
demarcated syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. One could equally well 
cluster the items of Table 2 completely differently and argue that a certain group 
combining civic and non-civic items represents the syndrome of, say, „positive outlook 
on life‟.   
 
 Table 1 about here 
 
 Table 2 about here 
 
Let us now see if a more convincing syndrome of civic culture can be found at the 
societal level. I used national aggregates of the WVS/EVS items to explore this issue.
3
 It 
                                                 
2
 The scales of a number of items have been reversed to ensure that a positive correlation between two civic 
items always denotes a relationship in the expected direction. The answers to the civic items have been 
interpreted in the following way: 
Discuss politics with friends: the more often – the more civic 
Signing a petition: have done – the more civic 
Jobs scarce priority men: disagree – the more civic  
Jobs scarce priority own nationality: disagree – the more civic 
Most people can be trusted / can‟t be too careful: most people can be trusted – the more civic 
Proportion of compatriots claiming state benefits: the less mentioned – the more civic 
Not like as neighbors, immigrants and foreign workers: not mentioned – the more civic 
Not like as neighbors, homosexuals: not mentioned – the more civic 
Number of different organizations, belonging to: the higher the number – the more civic 
Number of different organization, doing voluntary work for: the higher the number – the more civic 
 
3
 Obviously, the national level is only one of the collective levels at which civic culture could operate. 
Putnam for instance observed varying levels of civic traditions across regions within Italy. It must therefore 
be acknowledged that country aggregate data can hide important internal differences. Another matter is 
whether aggregate data can be used at all to measure a phenomenon at the societal level. According to van 
Deth (2001), the cross-correlation of aggregate data only reproduces relationships found at the micro-level. 
Aggregate date would thus not be an appropriate tool to study macro-level phenomena. I disagree. 
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turns out that the pattern of correlations at the societal level differs in two ways from that 
found at the individual level (see Table 3 for the correlations between national 
aggregates). First, there are more cases of unexpected relations between civic culture 
items. Notably the items „discuss politics with friends‟ and „compatriots unjustly 
claiming state benefits‟ are correlated negatively with several other items, although these 
correlations are not significant. Second, the correlations between the civic items are much 
stronger with 39 out of 66 binary correlations having values that exceed 0.40. This 
difference, however, is obviously related to the number of units on which the analysis 
was performed as the N in the correlations of aggregates is only a fraction of that in the 
correlations of individual level data. Indeed, as was the case at the individual level, the 
civic indices are as strongly correlated to the non-civic items as to each other.   
 
 Table 3 about here 
 
To probe the data further and explore underlying dimensions, I performed a principle 
component analysis on both levels of data (see Table 4).  The results of these analyses 
confirm that correlations between aggregates are stronger than those between individual 
level items. Whereas the (varimax-rotated) solution for the individual level finds as much 
as five dimensions which together explain a mere 52.4 per cent of the variance, the three 
dimensions extracted at the aggregate level account for no less than 77.7 per cent of the 
variance. Moreover, while each of the dimensions at the individual level is clustering 
items that refer to one component of civic culture only, the societal dimensions unite 
items which belong to different components. The first societal dimension, for instance, 
combines the items referring to political equality, trust and tolerance with passive 
participation (factor loadings of .60 and more), and explains an impressive 35.4 per cent 
of the variance even in a rotated solution. By contrast, the first dimension at the 
individual level only groups the two items representing solidarity and accounts for just 
12.2 per cent of the variance. Yet, and most importantly, there is not a single dimension 
capturing all or almost all of the components of civic culture at either of the two levels. 
Even at the macro-level, the first dimension faces strong competition from the second 
dimension which groups four civic items and collects almost as much of the variance as 
the first dimension (28.9 per cent). Moreover, both these dimensions are „polluted‟ by a 
non-civic item which also shows a high loading on the extracted factors. In short, neither 
at the individual nor at the societal level can a convincing syndrome of civic culture be 
found, i.e. a syndrome that is internally homogenous and externally distinctive. 
Interestingly, even the elements of the more restricted concept of social capital do not 
neatly group in one dimension at the societal level (active participation is the dissident as 
it loads on the second dimension). This means that the idea of social capital as a distinct 
phenomenon with the characteristics of a public good is not fully supported either. 
 
 Table 4 about here 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Theoretically, it is possible that a relationship at the macro-level between aggregates of individual 
characteristics is not manifested at the micro-level. It is for instance feasible that overall levels of civic 
values are high in a country while individuals in this country vary in the degree of support for these values.  
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The Nature of Civic Culture in East and West 
 
As noted before, issues of conceptual coherence and level of analysis have an obvious 
relevance for the topic of this paper as the nature of civic culture may differ across 
geographical contexts. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1997) for instance have argued that 
civic cooperation takes a completely different form in the postcommunist countries in 
comparison to the West. In the former, informal social networks with minimal links to the 
state predominate. This has been the legacy, the authors contend, of decades of 
totalitarian rule in which the relations between the state and the citizen were 
characterized by oppression, dependency and arbitrariness. Under these conditions, 
citizens developed a profound distrust in the state and in institutions under its control. 
Contacts with the state and formal institutions were minimized for fear of unexpected 
persecution, and if contacts were unavoidable the prevailing attitude was one of 
exploiting the state before it exploits you. The result of all this, Rose, Mishler and 
Haerpfer explain, has been the appearance in communist times of an hourglass society, 
composed of a mass of citizens minding their own business at the bottom, economic and 
political elites vying for power and wealth at the top, and a “missing middle” of minimal 
connections between these two groups (p. 91). Given these circumstances, it is no 
surprise that independent civic organizations, when they were finally permitted to exist 
alongside official institutions towards the end of the 1980s, quickly defined themselves in 
opposition to the state and the Communist Party (Smolar 1996). In the civic democracies 
of the West, by contrast, the individual is connected to the state through a network of 
informal and formal civic associations that negotiate with the state rather than blindly 
oppose it. Summing up, in the transition states there is a sharp rift between the private 
and the public, between the informal and the formal, while these domains are closely 
interwoven in the West. 
 Communist rule, however, has not only isolated individuals from the state but also 
from each other. In a society where the state makes use of informers to spy on its citizens, 
you “really cannot be too careful in dealing with people” as Uslaner (2003, p. 81) 
explains. The result has been, he notes, that people distrust strangers and will only share 
their innermost thoughts and political convictions with family and close friends. 
Networks of acquaintances and friends therefore tend to be much smaller, though perhaps 
at the same time much more intense and focussed, than in the West. In similar vein, 
Schoepflin (2000, p. 155) has argued that the authoritarian nature of communism not only 
strengthened vertical links of dependency but also undermining horizontal bonds of 
solidarity: “The hyperétatism of communism predictably produced (…) forms of 
dependence and individuation, in which interpersonal connections and interactions, other 
than those within the family and with very close friends, were laden with suspicion, 
distrust and a zero-sum game mentality, to create an atomised society”. In this 
environment, he contends, ethnic loyalties prevailed as they were the only bonds people 
could rely upon to counter feelings of alienation and atomisation.  
 Because of the alleged different nature of citizen-state and inter-citizen 
relationships, social capital in the transition countries has mainly been understood and 
examined as a micro-level phenomenon reflecting informal social networks (Mateju 
2002). Indeed, describing the coping strategies of three entrepreneurs in Hungary, Swain 
(2003) argues that the Bourdieu approach to social capital, which defines the concept as 
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„contacts with influential people‟ and therefore sees it as the property of an individual, is 
better equipped to analyse social relations in post-communist countries than the public 
good type of social capital advocated by Putnam. If civic relations in the East are as 
different as is claimed, what syndrome, or non-syndrome, of civic culture can we expect 
to find at the individual level using the indicators introduced in the previous section? As 
most of the indicators refer to citizen-state relations (political activity; civic honesty; 
passive and active participation
4
 - see once again Table 1), to relations with the 
anonymous other (social trust), and to relations with people with different lifestyles or 
different ethnic backgrounds (sexual tolerance; ethnic tolerance), we would expect levels 
of civic attitudes to be low across most indicators. This would have the effect of 
mitigating the correlations between them to the point they would no longer be significant 
or show a reversed sign. Among the remaining indicators, political discussions is the only 
one that seems to represent the informal social capital held to be so typical of the East. As 
it is not so much interest in politics per se as the way in which this interest is expressed, 
on which the regions are seen to differ, levels of political discussians are expected to be 
at least as high in the East in comparison to the West. The variation this produces on the 
indicator should be reflected in the correlations of this indicator with the other indicators 
of civic culture, which are likely to be of a higher magnitude. 
 Let us see if the data confirm these conjectures. Table 5 presents the correlations 
between the civic culture items for the two regions separately. It appears that the 
correlations are indeed weaker in the transition countries. Out of 66 correlations in total 
29 correlations in the West and 19 in the East have values of 0.10 or more. Seven 
correlations in the West and 18 in the East are not significant at the .05 level or show a 
reversed sign. Moreover, while in the West these seven correlations are confined to the 
two items representing solidarity, in the East the 18 correlations affect many more 
components of civic culture. Remarkably though, it is political activity, passive 
participation and the two solidarity indicators that show the highest correlations with 
other civic items in the East, not political discussions as we might have expected. What is 
more, the interregional differences are not dramatic. In both regions the vast majority of 
correlations are in the expected direction – in fact in only two cases in the West and five 
cases in the East is the sign reversed. Thus, civic values form an even weaker complex at 
the micro-level in the East as compared to the West, but this syndrome does not seem to 
be radically different. However, to fully explore the “bad effects of communism” 
argument, the levels of civic culture in the two regions have to be examined, which is 
what the next section does. 
 
 Table 5 about here 
 
 
Levels of civic culture in East and West 
 
This study is decidedly not the first to examine differences in civic culture in East and 
West. In recent years many studies have explored levels of civicness in the two regions 
and their relation to political and economic processes. Raiser et al (2001) for instance 
                                                 
4
 Passive and active participation in civic associations have a link to the state in a sense that associations are 
legal entities registered at some state institution. 
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found levels of social capital (interpersonal trust and civic participation) to be 
significantly lower in the East. Interestingly, they show that trust is not related to 
economic growth in the transition countries while it is positively correlated with growth 
in the OECD countries. Civic participation, on the other hand, is correlated with 
economic performance in both regions, a relation Raiser et al attribute to the ability of 
civic organizations to facilitate information exchange, reduce the cost of enforcement and 
offer interest groups the opportunity to participate in the political process. Using data 
from the mid-1990s, they also observe that social capital, in its turn, is negatively 
affected by income inequality, leading them to suggest that redistributive policies could 
be an effective way of increasing social and political trust. Examining the link between 
social capital and democratization, Dowley and Silver (2002) found no correlation 
between aggregate indicators of social capital and Freedom House measures on political 
rights and civil liberties for 20 post-communist states. At the individual level, however, 
they did find a relationship between social capital and attitudes supportive of democracy. 
Most notably, they discovered contrasting patterns for titular majorities and ethnic 
minorities. While there was a positive correlation between civic participation and support 
for democracy among the titular group, the reverse relationship applied for members of 
ethnic minorities, i.e. the more active members were less trusting of democratic 
institutions than the more passive ones. In ethnically diverse societies the links between 
social capital and democracy can thus be quite different from those seen in homogenous 
societies. While also examining social trust and civic participation, Uslaner (2003) is 
more concerned with their determinants than with their effects. He finds that the same set 
of factors influences trust and participation in the two regions despite their diverging 
political histories and different levels of civic mindedness. Consequently, he concludes 
that the socio-psychological mechanisms shaping civic attitudes have cross-regional 
validity.  
 What distinguishes the current study from the ones reviewed above is that it is 
much broader in scope, covering not just trust and participation but all the aspects of civic 
culture. Second, it explores the durability of civic culture in the two regions and in the 
transition countries in particular. It does so by introducing three perspectives on civic 
culture and by assessing to what extent the pattern of aggregate civic attitudes found in 
the WVS and EVS data matches the expected outcomes of these perspectives. Each of the 
perspectives assigns a different degree of stability to civic culture and predicts a different 
pattern of attitudes. The historical perspective locates the phenomenon in the distant past 
and assumes it to be highly resilient to the political and economic conditions prevailing at 
a given time in modern history. As noted before, it links civic culture to the emergence of 
independent cities and middle classes in some regions of Western Europe. Consequently, 
it expects civic culture to be stronger in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. The 
communist perspective outlined in the previous section sees civic culture as a more elastic 
phenomenon that is not as immune to political events as the historical perspective claims. 
It argues that communism either destroyed civic traditions or prevented civic values from 
developing in the countries where it monopolized political life. The main fault line 
regarding civic values is thus predicted to run along the former Iron Curtain. As noted 
above, the current study also uses this cleavage to identify „Eastern‟ and „Western‟ 
nations.  
 12 
At first sight, it seems difficult to assess which of these two perspectives has most 
explanatory power since both seemingly predict the same outcome (West-civic vs East-
uncivic). On close inspection, however, there are differences. The historical perspective 
assumes only some regions in the West to have strong civic traditions (England, France, 
Switzerland, the Low Countries, the British settler colonies). In the more peripheral parts 
of this region and notably in countries with a history of top-down modernization and 
(foreign) authoritarian rule (Germany, Austria, Greece, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal) or 
a legacy of semi-feudal relations exacerbated by religious divisions (Ireland), civic 
culture is expected to be underdeveloped. Likewise it predicts some variation among the 
former communist states, considering countries with a Standenstaat tradition – such as 
Bohemia (the Czech Republic) until the imposition of Austrian absolute rule in the 
seventeenth century (Anderson 1974) – and with a legacy of close economic ties with the 
West (the Baltics) to have stronger civic institutions than the isolated feudal societies 
further east. Thus, the historical perspective would predict almost as much variation 
within each region, certainly within the West, as between East and West. The communist 
perspective would not deny variation within the postcommunist world as both the 
duration and nature of communist rule differed from country to country. Yet it anticipates 
more variation between the postcommunist countries and the western market economies 
than within these regions, and most definitely on the indicators of civic culture that refer 
to citizen-state relations and attitudes towards strangers or ethnic others.  
In the third perspective civic culture is an even more flexible phenomenon, 
affected not only by long term regime policies but also and above all by sudden and 
drastic socio-economic changes. This we might call the transition perspective, which 
obviously has particular relevance for the postcommunist states. In this view, the socio-
economic restructuring following the collapse of communism and the inability of the new 
democratic institutions to enforce the law, offer moral guidance and guarantee a basic 
level of economic livelihood gave rise to profound feelings of existential insecurity and 
helplessness. Under these conditions people developed a deep distrust of politicians and 
institutions and withdrew into the small circles of family, friends and ethnic kin to retain 
some measure of control over their lives. According to Snyder (1993, p. 86) ethnic 
nationalism was the logical consequence of these processes: “It [ethnic nationalism] 
predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling 
people‟s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily 
available”. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 141) similarly stress that “Existential threats 
drive people to seek safety in closely knit groups (…). Under conditions of insecurity, 
social capital is bonding rather than bridging”. What pattern of civic attitudes would the 
transition perspective predict? It would anticipate that civic attitudes by and large 
correspond to economic trends in the transition period. This means that levels of civic 
consciousness should be at their nadir at the same time as or soon after the moment the 
economy starts to grow after several years of sharp decline. For some countries this 
turning point happened before 1995 (Poland, the Baltic republics) while others had to 
wait for the end of the 1990s for this to occur (Ukraine, Russia). However in all 
postcommunist states there should be a sharp decline in civic values after the fall of 
communism. Some, the transition perspective predicts, will already have recovered from 
the mid-1990 malaise by the close of the decade, others will still show a declining trend. I 
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will use World Bank data and the 1990, 1995 and 1999 waves of the WVS to explore the 
validity of the transition perspective. 
First I explore the explanatory power of the historical and communist 
perspectives. Table 6 presents the country aggregate values on the 12 indicators of civic 
culture. To facilitate interpretation the countries are ranked, with the postcommunist and 
western countries printed in bold and normal style respectively. This allows the reader to 
determine at a single glance whether Eastern countries cluster at either the top or bottom 
end of the scale. The top end always signifies strong civic culture. As we can see, western 
countries, as a group, exhibit significantly higher levels of civic consciousness than 
postcommunist societies on nearly all indicators. Only on civic honesty and political 
discussions compatriots unjustly claiming state benefits and discussing politics with 
friends is the difference in mean scores between the regions not significant or in the other 
direction, respectively. These findings broadly support both perspectives. The real test is 
the degree and nature of variation within each of the regions. 
 
 Table 6 about here 
 
To begin with the historical perspective, it can be seen that the countries in the West that 
are expected to have strong civic traditions indeed top the rankings on a good many 
indicators (particularly the Nordics, the former British settler colonies and the 
Netherlands). Vice versa, the „uncivic‟ countries in the West generally display only 
average values on most indicators (Germany, Austria, Italy) with some occasionally 
showing very low scores even in relation to the postcommunist countries (cf. Portugal on 
social trust and passive and active participation; Malta on the two indicators of equality). 
Likewise, in the East the historically more „civic‟ states perform well across a range of 
indicators (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia), whereas the countries in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus generally trail the rankings. Yet, there are also plenty of 
surprises. In the West, Britain and France have remarkably low scores for „civic‟ nations 
on many indicators. „Uncivic‟ Spain has high values on civic honesty and on the two 
tolerance indicators. In the East „uncivic‟ Slovakia does very well across a range of 
indicators, and „uncivic‟ Belarus has high scores on the two trust items. Moreover, 
country scores can fluctuate widely across indicators. Portugal for instance trails the 
ranking order on social trust but tops the one on ethnic tolerance. Similarly, Greeks are 
surprisingly active participants but have a dim view of the civic honesty of their 
compatriots. These large cross-indicator differences confirm the observation above that 
the internal consistency of civic culture is not very impressive. More importantly and to 
the detriment of the historical perspective, they also suggest that country specific factors 
and religion have a substantial impact on civic values.  
The data of Table 6 provide an equally mixed pattern of support for the 
communist perspective. On the one hand, the country rankings on political activity, 
ethnic equality, social trust and ethnic tolerance are in line with the expectation in a 
sense that the postcommunist countries almost en bloc occupy the lower half of the 
scales. These are moreover precisely the indicators on which the regions are expected to 
diverge most strongly. The higher average scores of postcommunist countries on political 
discussions is also anticipated as this particular indicator is likely to tap the informal type 
of social capital considered to be so salient in the East. On the other hand, the communist 
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perspective cannot account for the lack of regional differentiation on civic honesty. This 
indicator par excellence should show a substantial difference as citizen-state relations in 
the East are purportedly marked by mutual hostility and abuse. Equally disturbing for the 
theory is the substantial variation among the transition states on ethnic tolerance an the 
two association indicators.  
The survey data discussed here thus do not express a clear preference for either of 
the two perspectives. Both perspectives are supported in a more or less equal measure. In 
order to fully appreciate the durability of civic culture, however, the validity of the 
transition perspective needs to be examined. I assessed civic trends in those transition 
states that participated in all three WVS waves (1990-1991; 1995-1997; 1999-2000) since 
the demise of communism. Figure 1 shows the economic performance of these states 
during the 1990s measured in GNP per capita. Except for Poland and Slovenia whose 
economies started to recover at a very early stage, the other six states experienced a sharp 
decline in the early nineties and had to wait for the turning point until 1993-95. Towards 
the end of the millennium their economies had not yet reached their pre-independence 
levels. Consequently, the transition perspective would expect civic attitudes in these 
states to fall sharply between 1990 and 1995, to reach their lowest point in the mid-1990s 
and to show a modest recovery thereafter. In Slovenia and Poland levels of civic attitudes 
should be higher at the close of the decade than at the beginning. Table 7 presents the 
developments in civic values on six indicators of civic culture.
5
  It can be seen that the 
transition perspective works reasonably well for social trust, political discussions and 
political activity. The majority of countries display the expected mid 1990s dip on these 
indicators and in only three countries, two of them being Poland and Slovenia on political 
activity, are levels of civic values higher on the eve of the third millennium. Nonetheless 
there are also unexpected trends. Latvian levels of social trust first rise and then decline. 
In Poland civic values are stronger at the beginning of the 1990s than at the end (with the 
exception of political activity). What is also slightly difficult for the transition perspective 
to digest is that the fluctuations are fairly small. Levels of social trust remain low and the 
frequency of discussing politics remains high throughout the 1990s. Only the trends on 
political activity almost perfectly match the predicted pattern. Thus, the socio-economic 
transformation seems not to have impacted on civic values to the extent that the transition 
perspective expected. 
 
 Figure 1 about here 
 
 Table 7 about here 
 
More damaging for the perspective is that the trends on the other indicators are not at all 
following the anticipated pattern. Developments on ethnic equality and ethnic tolerance 
are in all kinds of directions. What can be observed is the persistent consensus across the 
board (Estonia excepting) that it is legitimate to give priority to co-nationals over 
immigrants when jobs are scarce (i.e. low levels of ethnic equality). Truly spectacular, 
however, are the steep upward trends on gender equality and sexual tolerance. During the 
                                                 
5
 The table does not present the two indicators on solidarity and the other trust indicator on trust (civic 
honesty) because these items were not asked in the 1995-97 wave. Passive and active participation are not 
included because the wording for these questions was different in the 1995-97 wave.  
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nineties people in the eight transition states, and most notably in the Baltics, have become 
much more accepting of homosexuals and have embraced the idea of gender equality in 
ever higher numbers, contrary to the prediction of the transition perspective. Possibly, 
these trends are not so much linked to socio-economic restructuring but to the change 
from a secluded communist society to an open democratic one absorbing cultural 
influences from the West. 
Reviewing the empirical evidence for the three perspectives, the rather 
unsatisfactory conclusion has to be drawn that there is some measure of support for all 
three of them. In other words, civic culture is a function of both slowly evolving 
historical processes and short and medium term political and economic developments. 
The support for each of the three perspectives, however, varies from country to country, 
which suggests that country specific factors have a strong bearing on civic culture as 
well. It also varies from indicator to indicator. The historical perspective is endorsed by 
political activity, social trust and passive and active participation as the allegedly strong 
civic nations top the rankings on these indicators and the „uncivic‟ nations are at the 
bottom end. The communist perspective is supported by those indicators on which the 
difference between the former communist world and the West is the largest, i.e. ethnic 
equality, sexual tolerance, and, once again, political activity. The transition perspective 
relies above all on political activity (yet again!) and to a lesser extent on social trust and 
discussing politics, as the trends on these indicators are as anticipated. Paradoxically, the 
variation on one single indicator (political activity) matches the predicted outcome of all 
three perspectives simultaneously. This illustrates as no other that all three perspectives 
seem to have a more or less equal measure of explanatory power. In a broader sense, 
theories that assume cultural dispositions to react strongly to recent events are 
corroborated by the drastically changing attitudes on gender equality and sexual 
tolerance in the transition states. The variation between indicators, moreover, underlines 
the observation above that civic culture is a highly heterogeneous concept as it includes 
notions that are highly responsive to recent events and notions which seem to have a fair 
amount of durability. Interestingly, though focussing on secular-rational values and self-
expression values, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) arrive at remarkably similar conclusions 
regarding the tenacity of culture and the main factors impinging on it.  They find that age 
old religious traditions, national idiosyncrasies, the legacy of communism and more 
recent socio-economic developments all exert a powerful influence on a society‟s value 
system. The influence of these factors however differs from value complex to value 
complex. Cultural legacies have a relatively greater impact on secular-rational values, 
while the dynamic of modernization can best account for changes in self-expression 
values. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Using WVS and EVS data to assess patterns of civic attitudes in East and West, this 
article has demonstrated that civic culture is not as coherent a set of attitudes as some 
cultural theorists, Putnam first of all, claim it is. At the individual level, the attitudes 
commonly associated with civic culture do not cluster to a sufficient degree for them to 
be clearly distinguished from other groups of dispositions. Moreover, there are 
geographical variations in the nature of civic culture as the correlations between civic 
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attitudes are weaker in the East than in the West. When tested empirically, the theoretical 
notion of civic culture thus not only constitutes a rather arbitrary collection of attitudes in 
the individual‟s mind, it also assumes different characteristics across regions. Civic 
values cluster slightly better at the societal level, but they do not form a convincing 
clearly demarcated one-dimensional syndrome at that level either. Even the more focused 
notion of social capital appears to be more a bi- than mono-dimensional phenomenon at 
the macro level, which is bad news for theorists who contend that it has the properties of 
a public good.    
 This study has also found civic culture to be significantly weaker in the former 
communist states across a wide range of indicators. The question it sought to answer is 
whether this difference is rooted in the pre-modern past or whether it is the consequence 
of more recent developments. In other words, how persistent are civic values and how 
insensitive are they to political and economic events? As it turns out, the data examined 
in this paper only partially support the notion that civic culture is a durable phenomenon. 
If it had been as durable as claimed, the pattern of civic attitudes across western countries 
and transition states would have closely matched the one expected by the historical 
perspective, which traces the roots of civic culture back to medieval times. Instead, the 
historical perspective correctly predicts the variation on only some attitudes in only some 
countries. The patterns on other attitudes are more in line with the expected outcomes of 
the legacy of communism perspective and the post-communist transition theory. These 
perspectives may be said to rival with the historical perspective in that they assign a 
higher degree of pliability to civic culture. Furthermore, the trends on two attitudes, 
gender equality and sexual tolerance, show such a spectacular and unexpected increase 
throughout the 1990s in several transition societies, that other factors not explored in this 
study are likely to have impacted on civic values as well. Yet, it must be borne in mind 
that this study, by relying on survey data that cover a time span of no more than ten years, 
could only partially explore the persistence of civic attitudes. Examining trends of civic 
culture across much larger time intervals, in a manner that Putnam has done for Italy, 
would have produced stronger conclusions. 
 Summing up, civic culture seems not to be the coherent and durable phenomenon 
that some theorists assume it to be. This has two implications. First, the continued use of 
the term „civic culture‟ should be questioned. Is seems wiser to rearrange the conceptual 
labelling and grouping of civic values to arrive at syndromes which include more 
restricted but more coherent sets of values. Even the more parsimonious notion of social 
capital and the elements it is said to include in this sense needs revision. An interesting 
direction of future research, therefore, would be to identify these syndromes, to examine 
their durability across a substantial period of time, and to assess the extent to which 
democracy and socio-economic development depend on them. Second, because civic 
values would appear to be at least as much the result of recent economic and political 
processes as the outcome of path dependencies, „uncivic‟ regions are not doomed to be 
burdened with authoritarian cultures and atomized societies forever. This is positive news 
for all those who believe that civic values are a crucial condition for democracy.  
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Figure 1. Trends in GNP per capita in selected transition states  
                during the 1990s 
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Table 1. Indices of Civic Culture 
 
Components of civic 
culture identified by 
Putnam 
Indices from data bases Referred to in 
the following 
as 
In 
WVS 
or EVS 
Civic engagement 
(active participation in 
public affairs) 
1. Discuss political matters with friends 
(frequently, occasionally or never) 
2. Signing a petition (have done, might 
do, would never do) 
1.Political 
discussions 
2. Political 
activity 
WVS 
 
WVS 
Political equality 
(accepting the other as 
equal) 
3. When jobs are scarce, men should 
have more right to a job than women 
(agree, neither, disagree) 
4. When jobs are scarce, employers 
should give priority to [OWN 
NATIONALITY] over immigrants 
(agree, neither, disagree) 
3. Gender 
equality 
 
4. Ethnic 
equality 
WVS 
 
 
WVS 
Solidarity 
(being helpful) 
Would you be prepared to actually do 
something to improve the conditions of 
… 
5. the elderly in your country?  
(1 absolutely yes – 5 absolutely no) 
6. the sick and disabled in your country? 
(1 absolutely yes – 5 absolutely no) 
5. Helping 
elderly 
 
6. Helping 
sick&disabled 
 
 
EVS 
 
EVS 
Trust 
(trust in the anonymous 
other) 
7. Most people can be trusted / can‟t be 
too careful 
8. How many compatriots claim state 
benefits to which they are not entitled? 
(1 almost all – 4 almost none) 
7. Social trust 
 
8. Civic 
honesty 
WVS 
 
EVS 
Tolerance 
(respect for people from 
other culture / with 
different lifestyles and 
ideas) 
Which people would you not like to 
have as neighbors? 
9. Immigrants/foreign workers 
10. Homosexuals (mentioned – not 
mentioned) 
9. ethnic 
tolerance 
 
10. sexual 
tolerance 
 
 
WVS 
WVS 
Association 
(membership of and 
active involvement in 
organizations) 
11. Number of different organizations 
respondent belongs to*  
12. Number of different organizations 
respondent does voluntary work for 
11. passive 
participation 
12. active 
participation 
WVS 
 
WVS 
 
* The WVS asked respondents whether they belonged to and did voluntary work for the following types of 
organizations: social welfare for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; religious or church 
organizations; education, arts, music or cultural activities; labor unions; political parties or groups; local 
community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; third world development or 
human rights; conservation, environment, animal rights groups; professional associations; youth work; 
sports or recreation; women‟s groups; peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health; 
other groups. It needs to be underlined that this measure only asked respondents whether they belonged to 
one or more organizations of each single type. Thus it does not measure the variation of membership within 
each type.   
 
 
 
 
 22 
Table 4. Principe Components Analysis of civic attitudes in 46 eastern and western 
countries (varimax rotation) 
 
Variables Individual level Aggregate level 
      Component I II III IV V I II III 
 
 
 
Civic 
culture 
indices 
Political 
discussions 
.05 .09 -.04 -.01 .73 .15 -.08 .80 
Political 
activity 
.18 .21 .20 .39 .34 .54 .72 -.00 
Gender 
equality 
.03 -.06 .41 -.06 .31 .82 .15 .07 
Ethnic 
equality 
.04 .11 .55 -.04 .18 .83 .20 .13 
Helping 
elderly 
.93 .07 .03 .05 -.01 -.02 .92 -.17 
Helping 
sick&disabled 
.93 .07 .04 .06 -.01 -.02 .92 -.14 
Social  
trust 
-.04 .33 .38 .07 .12 .83 .16 .12 
Civic  
honesty 
-.17 .34 .32 -.30 -.18 .75 -.40 .15 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
.02 -.06 .63 .05 -.06 .69 -.31 -.31 
Sexual 
tolerance 
.04 .05 .63 .32 -.07 .72 -.27 -.27 
Passive 
participation 
.10 .83 .08 .18 .14 .75 .53 .23 
Active 
participation 
.10 .83 -.07 .06 .10 .48 .71 .36 
Other 
indices 
Education 
 
-.10 .11 -.16 .04 .67 -.04 -.11 .84 
Feeling  
happy 
.06 .19 .17 .63 -.16 .60 .52 -.39 
Leisure 
important 
-.01 .01 -.03 .74 09 .50 .70 -.28 
Eigen-
value 
 1.83 1.72 1.62 1.34 1.33 5.3 4.3 2.0 
% of 
variance 
 12.2 11.5 10.8 9.0 8.9 35.4 28.9 13.4 
   N 
 
 60,000 46 
 
NB: loadings of  0.6 and more are given in bold. 
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Table 6. Civic attitudes in East and West (national aggregates) 
 
Civic Engagement Political Equality Solidarity 
Political discussions Political activity Gender equality Ethnic equality Helping elderly Helping sick&disabled 
Discuss politics friends Signing a petition Priority men Priority nation Help elderly? Help sick&disabled? 
country % fre-
quently + 
occa-
sionally 
country % have 
done 
country % dis-
agreeing 
country % dis-
agreeing 
country % yes and 
absolutely 
yes 
country % yes and 
absolutely 
yes 
CZE    87.30 SWE    87.40 SWE    97.60 SWE    87.40 SWE    85.40 SWE    87.80 
SLV    86.50 USA    81.10 ICE    96.40 NL     69.10 IRE    80.50 ICE    82.70 
Nor    86.00 GB     79.30 DEN    93.50 DEN    61.30 ITA    80.40 ITA    82.20 
LIT    85.20 AUS    78.40 FIN    89.40 NOR    55.40 CRO    76.40 MAL    82.10 
Ger    83.90 CAN    73.30 USA    89.20 AUS    51.80 MAL    76.30 IRE    81.40 
EST    82.10 B      68.50 NL     87.10 EST    48.10 ICE    73.00 CRO    79.40 
MOL    81.30 FRA    68.30 EST    84.80 CAN    47.40 FIN    71.90 CZE    76.30 
Den   80.10 NOR    64.70 NOR    84.70 LUX    46.60 SLV    69.20 FIN    73.30 
Swe    80.00 SWI    63.60 CAN    84.40 USA    44.80 B      67.20 SLV    71.70 
BELA    79.90 N IRL  60.40 IRE    83.50 B      40.90 POL    67.20 POL    71.50 
MAC    79.90 IRE    59.60 N IRL  82.60 FRA    40.00 DEN    66.70 GRE    70.80 
Nl     79.70 SLV    59.30 SLO    79.20 GB     35.60 ROM    66.50 SLO    70.80 
CRO    79.70 NL     59.10 GRE    78.50 GER    33.90 GRE    65.80 DEN    70.10 
MONT   78.70 CZE    58.70 CZE    78.20 FIN    29.60 SLO    64.90 B      68.10 
Gre    78.60 DEN    56.80 LAT    77.80 SWI    28.60 CZE    62.60 N IRL  66.10 
Ice    78.30 AU     56.70 FRA    75.80 ICE    27.30 N IRL  62.40 NL     65.80 
UKR    77.90 ITA    54.60 SP     74.30 POR    26.30 NL     62.20 LUX    65.50 
ARM    77.80 LUX    53.20 GB     73.60 UKR    25.30 LUX    60.60 POR    65.40 
ALB    77.60 ICE    53.00 B      73.50 ARM    25.00 FRA    58.70 BUL    65.00 
Swi    77.50 GER    50.60 HUN    73.00 ITA    24.80 POR    58.50 ROM    63.90 
LAT    77.40 GRE    49.60 AUS    72.70 SP     23.20 BUL    58.30 FRA    61.80 
SERB   76.60 FIN    49.60 LIT    72.20 IRE    22.70 AU     57.80 HUN    59.50 
POL    76.40 CRO    35.00 BELA    72.00 RUS    22.10 HUN    57.40 LAT    58.70 
RUS    75.00 MAL    33.20 LUX    70.90 N IRL  20.40 SP     56.80 GB     58.30 
Usa    74.60 SLO    32.40 SLV    69.30 AU     20.20 LAT    55.80 AU     57.30 
Au     74.20 SERB   28.80 CRO    68.50 LAT    19.80 GB     54.00 SP     54.70 
BUL    73.80 SP     28.60 ITA    67.80 MOL    17.80 GER    50.20 RUS    48.60 
Fin    73.70 LIT    27.40 GER    67.80 ROM    16.40 RUS    49.80 GER    48.50 
BOS    73.00 MAC    26.50 AU     67.10 SLO    13.90 UKR    39.80 UKR    41.00 
GEOR   72.50 MONT   23.90 SWI    67.00 GRE    13.90 LIT    35.00 EST    39.70 
SLO    72.20 POR    22.60 POR    66.70 SERB   11.20 EST    33.10 LIT    35.00 
Aus    69.30 POL    22.50 UKR    66.10 GEOR   10.40 BELA   7.40 BELA   9.50 
Lux    69.00 ALB    22.40 MONT   65.80 BELA    10.20 NOR    . NOR    . 
Ita    67.60 BOS    22.00 SERB   64.70 CZE    9.60 AUS    . AUS    . 
N irl  66.40 EST    20.60 BOS    64.30 MAC    9.60 CAN    . CAN    . 
Fra    64.80 LAT    19.10 RUS    59.00 ALB    9.10 USA    . USA    . 
Can    63.70 MOL    18.00 POL    57.80 AZE    8.70 SWI    . SWI    . 
B      62.80 ARM    17.80 ROM    55.60 MONT   7.20 ARM    . ARM    . 
Mal    62.40 HUN    14.70 BUL    53.70 HUN    6.80 MOL    . MOL    . 
ROM    62.30 UKR    14.20 MAL    48.30 BUL    6.20 SERB   . SERB   . 
Ire    59.60 GEOR   13.90 MOL    46.40 CRO    6.10 GEOR   . GEOR   . 
HUN    53.90 RUS    11.60 MAC    45.20 SLV    5.50 MAC    . MAC    . 
Sp     52.90 BUL    11.10 ALB    40.30 MAL    4.50 ALB    . ALB    . 
AZE    52.50 ROM    10.70 ARM    34.30 POL    3.90 AZE    . AZE    . 
Por    50.90 AZE    10.10 AZE    30.50 LIT    3.70 MONT   . MONT   . 
Gb     48.50 BELA    8.80 GEOR   28.50 BOS    . BOS    . BOS    . 
            
West 69.8  58.8  77.9  37.2  66.0  69.0 
East 75.6  23.0  60.3  13.5  53.1  56.5 
West - East -5.9*  35.8**  17.6**  23.7**  12.9*  12.5* 
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Trust Tolerance Associations 
Social trust Civic honesty Ethnic tolerance Sexual tolerance Passive participation Active participation 
Most people can be 
trusted / can‟t be too 
careful 
Compatriots 
claiming state 
benefits 
Don‟t like 
immigrants as 
neighbours 
Don‟t like 
homosexuals as 
neighbours 
Belonging to 
different 
organizations 
Voluntary work for 
different 
organizations 
country % most 
people 
can be 
trusted 
country % 
some + 
almost 
none 
country % not 
mentio
ned 
country % not 
mentio
ned 
country Average 
number 
country Average  
number 
DEN    66.50 NL     92.40 POR    97.50 SWE    93.90 USA    3.26 USA    1.88 
SWE    66.30 SP     79.60 SWE    97.20 NL     93.80 SWE    3.24 SWE    1.15 
NOR    65.30 LAT    72.60 ICE    97.00 ICE    92.10 NL     3.06 CAN    1.06 
NL     59.80 LIT    70.00 CAN    95.80 DEN    92.00 ICE    2.70 GRE    .96 
FIN    58.00 DEN    69.30 AUS    95.40 GER    86.90 CAN    1.96 NL     .93 
BELA   41.90 BELA   69.30 NL     95.00 NOR    85.70 DEN    1.92 SLV    .81 
ICE    41.10 SWE    67.10 SERB   92.30 FRA    84.40 FIN    1.86 B      .66 
SWI    41.00 B      67.10 LUX    91.60 SP     83.60 ALB    1.72 FIN    .65 
AUS    39.90 FRA    62.40 GER    91.40 CAN    83.10 B      1.65 LUX    .63 
N IRL  39.50 FIN    62.30 SP     90.70 B      82.60 AU     1.48 DEN    .57 
CAN    38.80 EST    60.00 LAT    90.20 SWI    81.50 LUX    1.45 IRE    .57 
SP     38.50 RUS    59.40 NOR    90.20 LUX    81.40 GRE    1.25 SLO    .54 
USA    35.80 CZE    55.90 SWI    90.00 CZE    80.30 IRE    1.15 ICE    .53 
IRE    35.20 ICE    55.60 USA    89.90 FIN    78.70 MAC    1.13 CZE    .50 
GER    34.80 UKR    52.80 DEN    89.40 USA    76.70 SLV    1.12 MAL    .50 
AU     33.90 CRO    52.60 GEOR   89.10 GB     75.70 CZE    1.02 AU     .47 
MONT   33.70 BUL    51.90 RUS    88.90 AUS    75.30 SLO    .98 ITA    .46 
ITA    32.60 GER    50.80 FRA    88.00 POR    74.80 N IRL  .93 N IRL  .37 
B      30.70 IRE    46.80 AU     87.80 AU     74.60 MONT   .89 FRA    .37 
GB     29.70 POR    42.70 IRE    87.70 GRE    73.20 MOL    .89 CRO    .35 
UKR    27.20 SLV    40.80 FIN    87.00 IRE    73.10 GER    .84 LAT    .29 
BUL    26.90 AU     40.60 GRE    86.30 ITA    71.30 ITA    .78 EST    .28 
LUX    26.00 N IRL  40.00 UKR    85.10 N IRL  64.80 CRO    .67 GER    .27 
LIT    24.90 GB     38.20 MAL    84.70 MAL    60.40 MAL    .62 SP     .27 
ARM    24.70 POL    36.60 GB     84.50 SLV    56.00 FRA    .61 HUN    .26 
ALB    24.40 GRE    33.70 SLO    84.00 SLO    55.70 GB     .61 BELA   .25 
CZE    23.90 ITA    24.40 ITA    83.50 LAT    54.50 BOS    .55 BUL    .24 
GRE    23.70 MAL    20.70 ALB    83.50 EST    53.80 BELA   .52 ROM    .21 
RUS    23.70 ROM    14.20 BELA   82.90 SERB   50.90 EST    .50 POL    .20 
EST    22.80 HUN    4.40 N IRL  82.00 CRO    47.20 SP     .48 POR    .18 
FRA    22.20 NOR    . B      81.80 MAC    46.50 SERB   .47 UKR    .16 
HUN    21.80 SWI    . MAC    81.40 BUL    46.10 UKR    .45 LIT    .16 
SLO    21.70 AUS    . MOL    81.20 POL    44.80 HUN    .43 RUS    .10 
MAL    20.70 CAN    . CZE    80.60 RUS    42.10 LAT    .41 ALB    . 
AZE    20.50 USA    . AZE    80.10 BELA   36.70 POL    .40 MAC    . 
POL    18.90 MONT   . MONT   79.90 BOS    35.80 RUS    .39 MONT   . 
SERB   18.80 LUX    . EST    79.10 ROM    34.80 POR    .33 MOL    . 
GEOR   18.70 ARM    . ROM    78.90 UKR    34.30 BUL    .32 GB     . 
CRO    18.40 ALB    . ARM    78.40 LIT    32.50 ROM    .31 BOS    . 
LAT    17.10 SLO    . CRO    78.30 MONT   26.30 LIT    .23 SERB   . 
BOS    15.80 AZE    . SLV    77.10 GEOR   23.00 NOR    . NOR    . 
SLV    15.70 SERB   . POL    76.50 MOL    22.60 SWI    . SWI    . 
MOL    14.70 GEOR   . LIT    76.40 ALB    17.40 AUS    . AUS    . 
MAC    13.50 BOS    . BUL    75.40 ARM    16.70 GEOR   . GEOR   . 
ROM    10.10 MOL    . BOS    75.20 AZE    9.30 ARM    . ARM    . 
POR    10.00 MAC    . HUN    . HUN    . AZE    . AZE    . 
            
West 38.7  52.6  89.8  80.0  1.5  0.7 
East 21.7  49.3  81.6  39.4  0.7  0.3 
West - East 17.0**  3.3  8.2**  40.6**  0.8**  0.4** 
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Table 7. Trends in civic attitudes in eight transition states 
 
 Political discussions 
(% frequently and occasionally) 
 Political activity 
(% have signed a petition) 
 1990 1995-97 1999-00  1990 1995-97 1999-00 
Bulgaria 88.3 70.0 73.8  21.6 5.7 11.1 
Estonia 94.6 79.1 82.1  39.0 13.0 20.6 
Latvia 96.4 84.5 77.4  64.6 29.8 19.1 
Lithuania 94.4 76.8 85.2  58.3 27.1 27.4 
Poland 82.7 67.6 76.4  14.1 18.7 22.5 
Slovenia 82.0 75.3 72.2  27.6 18.8 32.4 
Belarus 90.7 79.4 79.9  27.0 9.1 8.8 
Russia 82.0 74.0 75.0  27.1 9.1 11.6 
        
 Gender equality 
(% disagreeing with statement 
„priority men when jobs are scarce‟) 
 Ethnic equality 
(% disagreeing with statement 
„priority own nation when jobs are 
scarce‟) 
 
 1990 1995-97 1999-00  1990 1995-97 1999-00 
Bulgaria 50.7 53.1 53.7  10.8 7.3 6.2 
Estonia 14.9 61.9 84.8  3.5 46.2 48.1 
Latvia 29.6 69.1 77.8  5.7 50.2 19.8 
Lithuania 11.2 60.9 72.2  2.7 3.7 3.7 
Poland 21.6 48.0 57.8  12.3 4.8 3.9 
Slovenia 68.1 67.6 79.2  16.0 8.6 13.9 
Belarus 58.6 46.2 72.0  39.7 16.8 10.2 
Russia 55.4 43.6 59.0  32.7 19.2 22.1 
        
 Ethnic tolerance 
(% not expressing reservations about 
immigrants as neighbours) 
 Sexual tolerance 
(% not expressing reservations about 
homosexuals as neighbours) 
 
 1990 1995-97 1999-00  1990 1995-97 1999-00 
Bulgaria 65.5 84.4 75.4  32.5 59.2 46.1 
Estonia 82.9 81.0 79.1  27.1 36.1 53.8 
Latvia 69.2 81.8 90.2  21.6 40.8 54.5 
Lithuania 85.2 70.6 76.4  12.6 23.3 32.5 
Poland - 78.7 76.5  - 33.9 44.8 
Slovenia 60.4 81.9 84.0  57.5 38.8 55.7 
Belarus 83.0 93.7 82.9  21.0 36.6 36.7 
Russia 88.9 87.8 88.9  18.4 29.0 42.1 
        
 Social trust 
(% most people can be trusted) 
    
     
 1990 1995-97 1999-00     
Bulgaria 30.4 28.6 26.9     
Estonia 27.6 21.5 22.8     
Latvia 19.0 24.7 17.1     
Lithuania 30.8 21.9 24.9     
Poland 34.5 17.9 18.9     
Slovenia 17.4 15.5 21.7     
Belarus 25.5 24.1 41.9     
Russia 37.5 23.9 23.7     
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Table 2. Correlations between indices of civic culture at the individual level (pooled data of eastern and western countries) 
 
Indices of civic culture Other indices 
 Political 
discus-
sions 
Political 
activity 
Gender 
equality 
Ethnic 
equality 
Helping 
elderly 
Helping 
sick & 
disabled 
Social 
trust 
Civic 
honesty 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
Sexual 
tolerance 
Passive 
particip-
ation 
Active 
particip-
ation 
Educa-
tion 
Feeling 
happy 
Leisure 
impor-
tant 
Political 
discussions 
 .18** .04** .05** .06** .06** .09** .04** .04** .01** .14** .11** .20** .00 .03** 
Political 
activity 
  .13** .12** .16** .17** .15** .02** .09** .27** .27** .20** .14** .20** .14** 
Gender 
equality 
   .19** .01 .02** .07** .04** .06** .15** .06** .04** .07** .06** .04** 
Ethnic  
equality 
    .04** .05** .13** .08** .10** .15** .13** .10** .12** .09** .05** 
Helping 
elderly 
     .79** .03** -.06** .02** .06** .15** .13** -.02** .11** .08** 
Helping 
sick&disabled 
      .03** -.06** .03** .08** .16** .14** -.01 .13** .08** 
Social  
trust 
       .11** .08** .15** .19** .11** .11** .14** .06** 
Civic  
honesty 
        .05** .04** .09** .03** .06** .04** -.02** 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
         .26** .06** .03** .07** .08** .04** 
Sexual 
tolerance 
          .12** .08** .04** .20** .11** 
Passive 
participation 
           .63** .20** .19** -.11** 
Active 
participation 
            .16** .13** -.08** 
 
* P < .05   ** P < .01 
NB1: Correlations larger than 0.1 are printed in bold. 
NB2: Unexpected correlations between civic culture items (negative signs) are underlined. 
NB3: The scales of some of the other indices have been reversed so that positive correlations always express the regularity that higher levels of civicness are linked with higher 
levels of education, stronger feelings of happiness, and more importance attached to leasure. 
NB4: The N ranges from 35,000 to 60,000 respondents in the cells. 
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Table 3. Correlations between indices of civic culture at the societal level (aggregate data of eastern and western countries) 
 
Indices of civic culture Other indices 
 Political 
discus-
sions 
Political 
activity 
Gender 
equality 
Ethnic 
equality 
Helping 
elderly 
Helping 
sick & 
disabled 
Social 
trust 
Civic 
honesty 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
Sexual 
tolerance 
Passive 
particip-
ation 
Active 
particip-
ation 
Educa-
tion 
Feeling 
happy 
Leisure 
impor-
tant 
Political 
discussions 
 -.00 .04 .12 -.18 -.13 .19 .39* -.16 -.09 .21 .13 .28 -.16 -.22 
Political 
activity 
  .65** .63** .51** .51** .57** .15 .47** .81** .68** .76** -.06 .80** .73** 
Gender 
equality 
   .58** .16 .14 .71** .49** .44** .78** .55** .55** -.19 .59** .47** 
Ethnic  
equality 
    .16 .14 .62** .49** .63** .66** .67** .51** -.19 .50** .52** 
Helping 
elderly 
     .79** .13 -.27 .19 .46** .45* .54** -.22 .42** .56** 
Helping 
sick&disabled 
      .11 -.26 .18 .48** .46** .55** -.20 .44** .56** 
Social  
trust 
       .51** .48** .59** .68** .42** .02 .55** .47** 
Civic  
honesty 
        .33 .27 .38* .17 .23 .21 .04 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
         .64** .53** .36* -.04 .50** .42** 
Sexual 
tolerance 
          .55** .52** -.29 .77** .71** 
Passive 
participation 
           .84** .25 .56** .47** 
Active 
participation 
            .45** .50** .60** 
 
* P < .05   ** P < .01 
NB1: All correlations with a significance of 99% or larger are printed in bold. 
NB2: Unexpected correlations between civic culture items (negative signs) are underlined. 
NB3: For the country aggregate values on the civic indices and the way they were calculated, see Table 6. The aggregate values on the education indicator are mean scores. The 
aggregate values on the feeling happy indicator are the addition soms of the individual responses “very happy” and “quite happy”. Similarly the aggregate values on the leisure 
indicator represent “very important” and “rather important”. 
NB4: The N ranges from 30 to 46 countries in the cells. 
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Table 5. Correlations between indices of civic culture at the individual level in East and West (pooled data of eastern and western 
countries) 
 
 East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
West 
 Political 
discus-
sions 
Political 
activity 
Gender 
equality 
Ethnic 
equality 
Helping 
elderly 
Helping 
sick & 
disabled 
Social 
trust 
Civic 
honesty 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
Sexual 
tolerance 
Passive 
particip-
ation 
Active 
particip-
ation 
Political 
discussions 
- .24** .04** .00 .08** .08** .04** .03** .02** .03** .11** .08** 
Political 
activity 
.21** - .12** .01 .17** .18** .04** .00 .03** .14** .20** .18** 
Gender 
equality 
.05** .08** - .16** .01 .04** .03** .03** .03** .12** .04** .04** 
Ethnic  
equality 
.11** .11** .20** - .01 .01 .04** .03** .04** .05** .05** .04** 
Helping 
elderly 
.07** .06** -.01 .01 - .82** -.03** -.11** -.02** .01 .12** .11** 
Helping 
sick&disabled 
.06** .06** -.01 .02** .74** - -.03** -.11** -.01 .05** .14** .12** 
Social  
trust 
.14** .13** .08** .16** .03** .03** - .04** .05** .06** .07** .05** 
Civic  
honesty 
.04** .03** .05** .11** -.02* -.02** .16** - .05** .02** .01 -.01 
Ethnic 
tolerance 
.05** .08** .07** .14** .03** .04** .09** .06** - .18** .01 .00 
Sexual 
tolerance 
.07** .12** .12** .15** -.01 -.00 .12** .09** .33** - .01 .06** 
Passive 
participation 
.21** .23** .07** .13** .12** .13** .20** .14** .05** .07** - .63** 
Active 
participation 
.15** .16** .03** .08** .11** .13** .11** .05** .02** .02** .62** - 
 
* P < .05   ** P < .01 
NB1: Correlations larger than 0.1 are printed in bold. 
NB2: insignificant correlations and correlations with an unexpected sign are underlined. 
NB3: The N ranges from 15,000 to 30,000 respondents in the cells. 
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